We propose a new definition of entropy of basic probability assignments (BPAs) in the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of belief functions, which is interpreted as a measure of total uncertainty in the BPA. Our definition is different from those proposed by Höhle, Smets, Yager, Nguyen, Dubois-Prade, Lamata-Moral, Klir-Ramer, Klir-Parviz, Pal et al., MaedaIchihashi, Harmanec-Klir, Abellán-Moral, Jousselme et al., Pouly et al., and Deng. We state a list of six desired properties of entropy for DS belief functions theory, four of which are motivated by Shannon's definition of entropy of probability functions, and the remaining two are requirements that adapt this measure to the philosophy of the DS theory. Three of our six desired properties are different from the five properties proposed by Klir and Wierman. We demonstrate that our definition satisfies all six properties in our list, whereas none of the existing definitions do. Our new definition has two components. The first component is Shannon's entropy of an equivalent probability mass function obtained using the plausibility transform, which constitutes the conflict measure of entropy. The second component is Dubois-Prade's definition of entropy of basic probability assignments in the DS theory, which constitutes the non-specificity measure of entropy. Our new definition is the sum of these two components. Our definition does not satisfy the subadditivity property. Whether there exists a definition that satisfies our six properties plus subadditivity remains an open question.
will argue, Klir-Wierman's properties are unsatisfactory to us. Our set of six properties is designed to address some of the shortcomings of Klir-Wierman's properties. Abellán and Moral [4] also propose additional properties. Some of these are also discussed in this paper.
First, there are several theories of belief functions in the literature. In this paper, we are concerned only with the Dempster-Shafer theory, which has as its centerpiece, Dempster's combination rule as the rule for aggregating evidence. For example, in the imprecise probability community, belief functions are regarded as encoding a set of probability mass functions (PMFs), whose lower envelope constitutes a belief function. Such a set of PMFs is called a credal set. However, as we will argue in Section 4, credal set semantics of belief functions are incompatible with Dempster's combination rule [43] [44] [45] 16] . Our goal is to define entropy of a BPA in the DS theory. Therefore, the first property we propose, called "consistency with DS theory semantics," is that a definition of entropy of a BPA in the DS theory should be based on interpretations of the BPA that are compatible with the basic tenets of DS theory, namely, Dempster's combination rule.
One method for defining entropy of a BPA m is to first transform the BPA to a corresponding PMF P m , and then use Shannon's entropy of P m as the entropy of m (see, e.g., [31, 17, 4, 22, 38] ). However, there are many ways to make such a transformation. Voorbraak [55] , and Cobb and Shenoy [6] , argue that any transform of BPA m in the DS theory should be consistent with Dempster's combination rule in the sense that P m 1 ⊕m 2 = P m 1 ⊗ P m 2 , where ⊕ denotes Dempster's combination rule, and ⊗ denotes Bayesian combination rule, i.e., pointwise multiplication followed by normalization. They propose a plausibility transform that satisfies this consistency requirement, and it can be shown that the plausibility transform is the only transform that satisfies such a consistency requirement. Our consistency with DS theory semantics property entails that if such a transform is used to define entropy of a BPA, then the transform must be the plausibility transform. This is to ensure that any definition of entropy of a BPA is relevant for the DS theory of belief functions.
Klir-Wierman's set of five properties, and our proposed set of six properties, include an additivity property that states that if m X and m Y are distinct BPAs for distinct variables X and Y , then entropy of m X ⊕ m Y should be the sum of the entropies of m X and m Y . Unfortunately, this additivity property is extremely weak, and is satisfied by almost all definitions that have been proposed in the literature. Our consistency with DS semantics property helps to bolster the additivity property. Second, the DS theory is considered more expressive than probability theory in representing ignorance. In probability theory, both vacuous knowledge of variable X with state space X , and knowledge that all states in X are equally likely are represented by the equally-likely PMF of X . In DS theory, we can represent vacuous knowledge of X by the vacuous BPA for X , and we can represent the knowledge that all states are equally likely by the equally-likely Bayesian BPA for X . Ellsberg [14] demonstrates that when offered a choice, many prefer to bet on the outcome of an urn with 50 red and 50 blue balls rather than on one with 100 total balls but for which the number of blue or red balls is unknown. This phenomenon is called Ellsberg paradox, as Savage's subjective expected utility theory [41] is unable to account for this human behavior. Two of Klir-Wierman's properties (called "set consistency" and "range") entail that the entropy of the vacuous BPA for X is equal to the entropy of the equally-likely Bayesian BPA for X . In our opinion, this is unacceptable. Clearly, there is greater uncertainty in a vacuous BPA than in an equally-likely Bayesian BPA, a fact demonstrated by Ellsberg paradox. Therefore, instead of these two properties, we formulate a "maximum entropy" property that states that entropy of a BPA m for X is less than or equal to the entropy of the vacuous BPA for X , with equality if and only if m is the vacuous BPA for X . Abellán and Moral [4] were the earliest to propose such a maximum entropy property.
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Shannon's definition of entropy for PMFs of discrete random variables, and its properties. In Section 3, we review the basic definitions in the DS belief functions theory. In Section 4, we propose six properties that an entropy function for BPA should satisfy. We compare our properties with those proposed by Klir and Wierman [26] , and also with a set monotonicity property proposed by Abellán and Masegosa [3] . In Section 5, we discuss the various definitions that have been proposed in the literature, and how they compare vis-a-vis our list of six properties. In Section 6, we propose a new definition of entropy for DS theory, and show that it satisfies all six properties proposed in Section 4. In Section 7, we discuss some additional properties of our definition. Finally, in Section 8, we summarize our findings, and conclude with some open questions.
Shannon's entropy of PMFs of discrete random variables
In this section we briefly review Shannon's definition of entropy of PMFs of discrete random variables, and its properties. Most of the material in this section is taken from [47, 30] .
Information content. Suppose X is a discrete random variable, with state space X , and PMF P X . Consider a state x ∈ X such that P X (x) > 0. What is the information content of this state? Shannon [47] defines the information content of state x ∈ X as follows:
Information content has units of bits. Intuitively, the information content of a state is inversely proportional to its probability. Observing a state with probability one has no information content (0 bits). Notice that I(x) ≥ 0, and I(x) = 0 if and only if P X (x) = 1.
Although we have used logarithm to the base 2, we could use any base (e.g., e, or 10), but this will change the units. Henceforth, we will simply write log for log 2 .
Shannon's entropy. Suppose X is a random variable with PMF P X . The entropy of P X is the expected information content of the possible states of X :
Like information content, entropy is measured in units of bits. One can interpret entropy H s (P X ) as a measure of uncertainty in the PMF P X (x). If P X (x) = 0, we follow the convention that P X (x) log(1/P X (x)) = 0 as lim θ→0 + θ log(1/θ ) = 0.
Suppose Y is another random variable, and suppose that the joint PMF of X and Y is P X,Y with P X and P Y as the marginal PMFs of X and Y , respectively. If we observe Y = a such that P Y (a) > 0, then the posterior PMF of X is P X|a (where P X|a (x) = P X,Y (x, a)/P Y (a)), and the respective posterior entropy is H s (P X|a ).
From our viewpoint, the following properties of Shannon's entropy function for PMFs are the most important ones:
1. H s (P X ) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if there exists x ∈ X such that P X (x) = 1. 2. H s (P X ) ≤ log(| X |), with equality if and only if P X (x) = 1 | X | for all x ∈ X . | X | denotes the cardinality (i.e., number of elements) of set X . 3. The entropy of P X does not depend on the labels attached to the states of X , only on their probabilities. This is in contrast with, e.g., variance of X , which is defined only for real-valued random variables. Thus, for a real-valued discrete random variable X , and Y = 10 X , it is obvious that
4. Shannon [47] derives the expression for entropy of X axiomatically using four axioms as follows. 
Shannon [47] proves that the only function H s that satisfies Axioms 0-3 is of the form
where K is a constant depending on the choice of units of measurement.
Suppose X and Y are discrete random variables with joint PMF P X,Y . Analogous to the one-dimensional case, the joint entropy of P X,Y is:
.
It is a collection of conditional PMFs, one for each x ∈ X . If we combine P X and P Y |X using pointwise multiplication followed by normalization, an operation that we denote by ⊗, then we obtain P X,Y , i.e.,
As P X and P Y |x are PMFs, there is no need for normalization (or the normalization constant is 1).
Shannon defined the entropy of P Y |X as follows:
We call H s (P Y |X ) the conditional entropy of Y given X .
It follows from Axiom 3 that
We call H s (P X ) the marginal entropy of X , and Eq. (5) 
Suppose P X and P Y are the marginal PMFs obtained from the joint PMF P X,Y . Then, it can be shown that (6) with equality if and only if X and Y are independent with respect to P X,Y . The inequality in Eq. (6) is called subadditivity in the literature (see, e.g., [13] ).
Basic definitions of the DS belief functions theory
In this section we review the basic definitions in the DS belief functions theory. Like the various uncertainty theories, DS belief functions theory includes functional representations of uncertain knowledge, and operations for making inferences from such knowledge. Basic probability assignment. Suppose X is a random variable with state space X . Let 2 X denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X . A basic probability assignment (BPA) m for X is a function m :
The subsets a ∈ 2 X (recall that we exclude the empty set from 2 X ) such that m(a) > 0 are called focal elements of m.
An example of a BPA for X is the vacuous BPA for X , denoted by ι X , such that ι X ( X ) = 1. We say m is deterministic (or categorical) if m has a single focal element (with probability 1). Thus, the vacuous BPA for X is deterministic with focal element X . If all focal elements of m are singleton subsets of X , then we say m is Bayesian. In this case, m is equivalent to the PMF P for X such that P (x) = m({x}) for each x ∈ X . Let m u denote the Bayesian BPA with uniform probabilities, i.e., m u ({x}) = 1 | X | for all x ∈ X . If X is a focal element of m, then we say m is non-dogmatic, and dogmatic otherwise.
Thus, a Bayesian BPA is dogmatic.
Plausibility function.
The plausibility function Pl m corresponding to BPA m is defined as follows:
for all a ∈ 2 X . For an example, suppose X = {x, x}. Then, the values of the plausibility function Pl ι X corresponding to BPA ι X , are identically one for all three subsets in 2 X .
Belief function. The belief function Bel m corresponding to BPA m is defined as follows:
for all a ∈ 2 X . For the example above with X = {x, x}, the belief function Bel ι X corresponding to BPA ι X is given by
Commonality function. The commonality function Q m corresponding to BPA m is defined as follows:
for all a ∈ 2 X . For the example above with X = {x, x}, the commonality function Q ι X corresponding to BPA ι X is given
. This is because for singleton subsets a, the set of all subsets that have non-empty intersection with a coincides with the set of all supersets of a. Finally, Q m is a normalized function in the sense that:
All four representations-BPA, belief, plausibility, and commonality-are bearers of exactly the same information. Given any one, we can transform it to another [42] .
Next, we describe the two main operations for making inferences.
Dempster's combination rule. In the DS theory, we can combine two BPAs m 1 and m 2 representing distinct pieces of evidence by Dempster's rule [9] and obtain the BPA m 1 ⊕ m 2 , which represents the combined evidence. In this paper, it is sufficient to define Dempster's rule for BPAs for a single variable, and for BPAs for distinct variables.
Suppose m 1 and m 2 are two BPAs for X . Then,
for all a ∈ 2 X , where K is a normalization constant given by
The definition of Dempster's rule assumes that the normalization constant K is non-zero. If K = 0, then the two BPAs m 1 and m 2 are said to be in total conflict and cannot be combined. If K = 1, we say m 1 and m 2 are non-conflicting.
Dempster's rule can also be described in terms of commonality functions [42] . 
for all a ∈ 2 X , where the normalization constant K is as follows:
It is shown in [42] that the normalization constant K in Eq. (15) 
for all a × b ∈ 2 {X,Y } . Notice that in this case there is no need for normalization as there is no mass on the empty set, i.e., m X and m Y are always non-conflicting.
Marginalization. Marginalization in DS theory is addition of values of BPAs.
To define marginalization formally, we first need to define projection of states, and then projection of subset of states.
Projection of states simply means dropping extra coordinates; for example, if (x, y) is a state of {X, Y }, then the projection of (x, y) to X , denoted by (x, y) ↓X , is simply x, which is a state of X .
Projection of subsets of states is achieved by projecting every state in the subset.
Suppose m is a BPA for {X, Y }. Then, the marginal of m for X , denoted by m ↓X , is a BPA for X such that for each a ∈ 2 X , m
In Eq. (16) This completes our brief review of the DS belief function theory. For further details, we refer the reader to [42] .
Required properties of entropy of BPAs in the DS theory
In this section, we propose six basic properties that an entropy function for BPAs in the DS theory should satisfy, and compare them with those proposed by Klir and Wierman [26] for the same purposes. As a prelude to our first property, called consistency with DS theory semantics, we give some examples of interpretations of a BPA m that are inconsistent with DS theory semantics.
Credal set semantics of a BPA. For each BPA m for X , there exists a set P m of PMFs for X that is defined as follows [16] . Let P denote the set of all PMFs for X . Then,
Thus, a BPA m can be interpreted as an encoding of a set of PMFs as described in Eq. (18) . If m = ι X , then P ι X includes the set of all PMFs for X . If m is a Bayesian BPA for X , then P m includes a single PMF P X corresponding to the Bayesian BPA m.
P m is referred to as a credal set corresponding to m (see, e.g., [56] ). Notice that P m is yet another equivalent representation of m, like Bel m , Pl m , and Q m . Given P m , we can recover the other representations. As already mentioned in Section 1, this interpretation of a BPA function is incompatible with Dempster's combination rule [43] [44] [45] 16] , which is also illustrated in the following example. Example 1. Consider a BPA m 1 for X with state space X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } as follows: m 1 ({x 1 }) = 0.5, m 1 ( X ) = 0.5. With the credal set semantics of a BPA function, m 1 corresponds to a set of PMFs P m 1 = {P ∈ P : P (x 1 ) ≥ 0.5}, where P denotes the set of all PMFs for X . Now suppose we get a distinct piece of evidence m 2 for X such that m 2 ({x 2 }) = 0.5, m 2 ( X ) = 0.5. m 2 corresponds to P m 2 = {P ∈ P : P (x 2 ) ≥ 0.5}. The only PMF that is in both P m 1 and P m 2 is P ∈ P such that P (x 1 ) = P (x 2 ) = 0.5, and P (x 3 ) = 0. Notice that if we use Dempster's rule to combine m 1 and m 2 , we have:
. The set of PMFs P m 1 ⊕m 2 = {P ∈ P :
} is not the same as P m 1 ∩ P m 2 . Thus, credal set semantics of belief functions are incompatible with Dempster's combination rule.
Fagin and Halpern [15] propose another rule for updating beliefs, which is referred to as the Fagin-Halpern combination rule. If we start with a set of PMFs characterized by BPA m for X , and we observe some event b ⊂ X , then one possible updating rule is to condition each PMF in the set P m on event b, and then find a BPA m that corresponds to the lower envelope of the revised set of PMFs. The Fagin-Halpern rule [15] does precisely this, and is different from Dempster's rule of conditioning, which is a special case of Dempster's combination rule.
Transforming a BPA to a PMF. Given a BPA m for X in the DS theory, there are many ways to transform m to a corresponding PMF P m for X [8, 7, 46] . The main transforms used in the literature are the pignistic transform [12, 49] , the maximum entropy credal set transform [31, 17] , and the plausibility transform [55, 6] . However, only the plausibility transform, is consistent with m in the DS theory in the sense that P m 1 ⊕m 2 = P m 1 ⊗ P m 2 , where, as mentioned in Section 2, ⊗ is the combination rule in probability theory, and ⊕ is Dempster's combination rule in DS theory [55, 6] . Thus, if a probability transform is used to define entropy of m, then we argue that it must be the plausibility transform as it is the only one that is consistent with Dempster's combination rule.
First, let's define Bet P m . Suppose m is a BPA for X . Then Bet P m is a PMF for X defined as follows:
|a| (19) for all x ∈ X . It is easy to verify that Bet P m is a PMF. It is argued in [6] that Bet P m is an inappropriate probabilistic representation of m in the DS theory. The following example provides one reason why Bet P m is incompatible with Dempster's combination rule.
Example 2.
This example is taken from [50] . Consider a situation where we have vacuous prior knowledge of X with Now suppose we receive another distinct piece of evidence that is also represented by m. As per the DS theory, our total evidence is now m ⊕ m. If on the basis of m (or Bet P m ), x 1 was 15 times more likely than x 2 , then now that we have evidence m ⊕ m, x 1 should be even more likely (exactly 15 2 = 225 times) than x 2 . But Bet P m⊕m (x 1 ) ≈ 0.156 and Bet P m⊕m (x 2 ) ≈ 0.036. So according to Bet P m⊕m , x 1 is only 4.33 more likely than x 2 . This implies that the second piece of evidence favors x 2 over x 1 (by a factor of 15/4.33 = 3.46). But the two distinct pieces of evidence are represented by the same BPA. This doesn't make much sense, and the only rational conclusion is that Bet P m is inconsistent with Dempster's combination rule.
Next, let's define maximum entropy credal set transform, Cr P m . Suppose m is a BPA for X . Then Cr P m is a PMF for X defined as follows:
Cr P m = arg max
. (20) In words, Cr P m is the PMF of X that has the highest Shannon entropy of all PMFs in the credal set P m . Regarding numerical computation of the first component of Cr P m , which involves nonlinear optimization, some algorithms are described in [32, 34, 18, 29, 5] .
The following example illustrates the Cr P m transform, and shows that it does not satisfy the consistency with DS theory
Example 3. This example is adapted from [51] . A mafia boss has decided to assassinate Mr. Jones. He has three assassins on his payroll, Peter (pe), Paul (pa), and Mary (ma). We have two pieces of distinct evidence. First, the mafia boss will toss a fair coin to decide on the assassin-if the toss results in heads, he will pick either pe or pa, and we know nothing about the process of picking pe or pa. If the toss results in tails, he will pick ma. m 2 )({ma}) = 0.5. P m 1 ⊕m 2 = {P ∈ P : P (pa) = 0.5, P (ma) = 0.5}, which is a singleton subset. Therefore, Cr P m 1 ⊕m 2 is such that Cr P m 1 ⊕m 2 (pe) = 0, Cr P m 1 ⊕m 2 (pa) = 0.5, and Cr P m 1 ⊕m 2 (ma) = 0.5.
Notice that Cr P m 1 ⊗ Cr P m 2 is as follows: (Cr P m 1 ⊗ Cr P m 2 )(pe) = 0, (Cr P m 1 ⊗ Cr P m 2 )(pa) = 1/3, and (Cr P m 1 ⊗ Cr P m 2 )(ma) = 2/3, which is different from Cr P m 1 ⊕m 2 . Thus, Cr P m is inconsistent with Dempster's combination rule.
Finally, let's define the plausibility transform [55, 6] . Suppose m is a BPA for X . The plausibility transform, denoted by Pl_P m , is based on the plausibility function Pl m corresponding to m, and is defined as follows:
for all x ∈ X , where K is a normalization constant that ensures Pl_ P m is a PMF, i.e., K = x∈ X Pl m ({x}) = x∈ X Q m ({x}). [6] argues that of the many methods for transforming belief functions to PMFs, the plausibility transform is one that is consistent with Dempster's combination rule in the sense that if we have BPAs
where ⊗ denotes Bayes combination rule (pointwise multiplication followed by normalization). It can be shown that the plausibility transform is the only transform that has this property, which follows from the fact that for singleton subsets, the values of the plausibility function Pl m are equal to the values of the commonality function Q m , and the fact that Dempster's combination rule is pointwise multiplication of commonality functions followed by normalization (Eq. (14)). Now suppose we get a distinct piece of evidence that is identical to m, so that our total evidence is m ⊕m. If we compute m ⊕ m and Pl_P m⊕m , then as per Pl_P m⊕m , x 2 is 2.33 2 more likely than x 1 . This is a direct consequence of the consistency of the plausibility transform with Dempster's combination rule.
One practical use of an uncertainty theory is to make decisions under uncertainty. To achieve this, we must first agree on the semantics of the theory. The semantics of the DS belief function theory cannot be "a matter of personal opinion" [50] . For the BPA m in Example 2, does it mean that x 1 is 15 times more probable than x 2 (as suggested by the pignistic transform)? Or does it mean that x 2 is 2.33 more probable than x 1 (as suggested by the plausibility transform)? One way to decide is to base our decisions on the center-piece of the DS theory, Dempster's combination rule. It is Dempster's combination rule that distinguishes the DS theory from the Fagin-Halpern theory, which views a belief function as a credal set of PMFs.
There are, of course, semantics that are consistent with DS theory, such as multivalued mappings [9] , random codes [43] , transferable beliefs [51] , and hints [27] . is not postulating the use of a probability transform. Only that if a transform is used, then it must be consistent with Dempster's rule. As the plausibility transform is the only one that satisfies this property, any definition that uses a transform different from the plausibility transform will not satisfy this property. 
(Monotonicity
. (22) This is a weak version of the compound axiom for Shannon's entropy of a PMF (for the case of independent random variables).
The additivity property is quite weak, and is satisfied by most definitions of entropy that are on a log scale. The consistency with DS theory semantics property helps to bolster the additivity property, and ensures that any definition of entropy for m in the DS theory is consistent with Dempster's combination rule. As we will see in Section 5, not all previous definitions in the literature are consistent with Dempster's combination rule, even though they satisfy the additivity property.
Klir and Wierman [26] also describe a set of properties that they believe should be satisfied by any meaningful measure of uncertainty based on intuitive grounds. Some of the properties that they suggest are also included in the above list. For example, probability consistency and additivity appear in both sets of requirements. Nevertheless, two of them do not make intuitive sense to us.
First, Klir and Wierman suggest a property that they call "set consistency" as follows:
7. (Set consistency) H(m) = log(|a|) whenever m is deterministic with focal set a, i.e., m(a) = 1. This property would require that H(ι X ) = log(| X |). The probability consistency property would require that for the Bayesian uniform BPA m u , H(m u ) = log(| X |). Thus, these two requirements would entail that H(ι X ) = H(m u ) = log(| X |).
We disagree. Recall the Ellsberg paradox [14] phenomenon described in Section 1, also called ambiguity aversion. According to our requirements, H(ι X ) > H(m u ), which make more intuitive sense than requiring H(ι X ) = H(m u ). The Ellsberg paradox
phenomenon is an argument in favor of our requirements. The persons who prefer the urn with 50 red balls and 50 blue balls (whose uncertainty is described by H(m u )) to the urn with 100 total balls for which the number of blue or red balls is unknown (whose uncertainty is described by H(ι X )) do so because they are convinced that there is less uncertainty in H(m u ) than in H(ι X ).
Second, Klir and Wierman require a property they call "range" as follows:
The probability consistency property requires that H(m u ) = log(| X |). Also including the range property prevents us, e.g., from having H(ι X ) > H(m u ). So we do not include it in our list as it violates our intuition.
Finally, Klir and Wierman require the subadditivity property defined as follows. 
This property is the analog of the corresponding property for Shannon's entropy for probability distribution. We agree that it is an important property, and the only reason we do not include it in our list is because we are unable to meet this requirement in addition to the six requirements that we do include. Abellán and Moral [4] interpret a BPA m as a credal set of PMFs as in Eq. (18) . With this interpretation, they propose a set monotonicity property as follows.
(Set monotonicity)
If m 1 and m 2 are BPA functions for X with credal sets P m 1 and P m 2 , respectively, such that P m 1 
If the credal set semantics of a BPA function were appropriate for the DS theory, then it would be reasonable to adopt the set monotonicity property. However, as we have argued earlier, credal set semantics are not compatible with Dempster's combination rule. If our current knowledge of X is represented by BPA m 1 , and we obtain a piece of evidence represented by BPA m 2 for X that is distinct from m 1 , then in the DS theory, our new knowledge is represented by m 1 ⊕ m 2 . In general, it is not possible to formulate any relationship between P m 1 and P m 1 ⊕m 2 . For these reasons, we do not adopt Abellán-Moral's set monotonicity property.
Previous definitions of entropy of BPAs in the DS theory
In this section, we review all previous definitions of entropy of BPAs in the DS theory of which we are aware. We also verify whether or not these previous definitions satisfy the six basic properties described in Section 4.
Höhle.
One of the earliest definitions of entropy for DS theory is due to Höhle [20] , who defines entropy of BPA m as follows. Suppose m is a BPA for X with state space X .
where Bel m denotes the belief function corresponding to m as defined in Eq. (9) . Yager. Another definition of entropy of BPA m is due to Yager [57] :
where Pl m is the plausibility function corresponding to m as defined in Eq. (8). Yager's definition H y (m) measures only conflict in m, not total uncertainty. Like Höhle's and Smets' definitions, H y (ι X ) = 0, and therefore, H y does not satisfy the non-negativity, maximum entropy, and monotonicity properties. It does satisfy the probability consistency property because for Bayesian BPA, Pl m ({x}) = m({x}). It satisfies the consistency with DS theory semantics, the additivity property, but not the subadditivity property [13] .
Nguyen. Nguyen [35] defines entropy of BPA m for X as follows:
The same definition is stated in [33] . Like all previous definitions, it captures only the conflict portion of uncertainty. As in the previous definitions, H n (ι X ) = 0. Thus, H n does not satisfy the non-negativity, maximum entropy, and monotonicity properties. However, as it immediately follows from the properties of Shannon's entropy, it does satisfy the probabilistic consistency property. The fact that it also satisfies the additivity property follows from the fact that log of a product is the sum of the logs. Thus,
It satisfies the consistency with DS theory semantics property, but not the subadditivity property as can be seen from Example 5. [13] define entropy of BPA m for X as follows:
Dubois and Prade. Dubois and Prade
Dubois-Prade's definition captures only the non-specificity portion of uncertainty. If X is a random variable with state space X , Hartley [19] defines a measure of entropy of X as log(| X |). maximum entropy, and monotonicity properties, but it does not satisfy the non-negativity and probabilistic consistency properties. However, it does satisfy the additivity and subadditivity properties [13] . Ramer [39] proves that H d is the unique definition of non-specificity entropy of m that satisfies additivity and the subadditivity properties.
Lamata and Moral. Lamata and Moral [28] suggest a definition of entropy of BPA m as follows: 
, which violates the maximum entropy property.
It satisfies the consistency with DS theory semantics, non-negativity, monotonicity, probability consistency, and additivity, properties. It does not satisfy the subadditivity property [13] .
Klir and Ramer. Klir and Ramer [25] define entropy of BPA m for X as follows:
The first component in Eq. (30) is designed to measure conflict, and the second component is designed to measure nonspecificity. It is easy to verify that
, which violates the maximum entropy property. It satisfies the consistency with DS theory semantics, non-negativity, monotonicity, probability consistency, and additivity, properties. It does not satisfy the subadditivity property [53] . 
Klir and Parviz argue that the first component in Eq. (31) is a better measure of conflict than the first component in Eq. (30) .
Like H k (m), H p (m) satisfies the consistency with DS theory semantics, non-negativity, monotonicity, probability consistency, and additivity properties, but not the maximum entropy, and subadditivity [54] properties.
Pal et al.
Pal et al. [36, 37] define entropy H b (m) as follows:
H b (m) satisfies consistency with DS theory semantics, non-negativity, monotonicity, probability consistency, and additivity [37] , properties. 
where the first component is interpreted as a measure of conflict only, and the second component is interpreted as a measure of non-specificity. H i (m) satisfies all properties including the subadditivity property described in Eq. (23) [31] . As discussed in Section 4, the maximum entropy credal set transform Cr P m is not consistent with Dempster's combination rule.
H i (m) may be appropriate for a theory of belief functions interpreted as a credal set with the Fagin-Halpern combination rule. It is, however, inappropriate for the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions with Dempster's rule as the rule for combining (or updating) beliefs.
Harmanec and Klir. Harmanec-Klir [17] define H h (m) as follows:
where they interpret H h (m) as a measure of total uncertainty. Abellán [1] interprets min P X ∈P m H s (P X ) as a measure of conflict, and the difference between H h (m) and min P X ∈P m H s (P X ) as a measure of non-specificity. 
where K L(P X , Q X ) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between PMFs P X and Q X defined as follows:
and Q X ∈ P m is a PMF of X that has the maximum Shannon entropy in the first term, i.e.,
Like Maeda-Ichihashi's definition, Abellán-Moral's definition does not satisfy the consistency with DS theory semantics property.
Jousselme et al.
Jousselme et al. [22] define H j (m) based on first transforming a BPA m to a PMF Bet P m using the pignistic transform [12, 49] , and then using Shannon's entropy of Bet P m .
(A similar definition, called pignistic entropy, appears in [11] in the context of the Dezert-Smarandache theory, which can be considered a generalization of the DS belief functions theory.) H j (m) satisfies the non-negativity, monotonicity, probability consistency, and additivity properties [22] . It does not satisfy the maximum entropy property as
satisfies the subadditivity property (Eq. (23)), a counter-example is provided in [23] . One basic assumption behind H j (m) is that Bet P m is an appropriate probabilistic representation of the uncertainty in m in the DS theory. As we have argued in Section 4, Bet P m is inconsistent with Dempster's combination rule.
Pouly et al.
Pouly et al. [38] define entropy of a "hint" associated with a BPA m. A hint is a formalization of the multivalued mapping semantics for BPAs, and is more fine-grained than a BPA. Formally, a hint H = ( 1 , 2 , P , ) consists of two state spaces 1 and 2 , a PMF P on 1 , and a multivalued mapping : 1 → 2 2 . The PMF P and multivalued mapping induces a BPA m for 2 such that m( (θ 1 )) = P (θ 1 ). An example of a hint is as follows.
Example 6.
A witness claims that he saw the defendant commit a crime. Suppose that we have a PMF on the reliability R of the witness as follows. Let r and r denote the witness is reliable or not, respectively. Then, P (r) = 0.6, and P (r) = 0.4.
The question of interest, denoted by variable G, is whether the defendant is guilty (g) or not (ḡ). If the witness is reliable, then given his or her statement, the defendant is guilty. If the witness is not reliable, then his or her claim has no bearing on the question of guilt of the defendant. Thus, we have a multivalued mapping : {r, r} → 2 {g,ḡ} such that (r) = {g}, and (r) = {g, ḡ}. In this example, the hint H = ({r, r}, {g, ḡ}, P , ). (38) where m is the BPA on state space 2 induced by hint H . The expression in Eq. (38) is derived using Shannon's entropy of a joint PMF on the space 1 × 2 whose marginal for 1 is P , and an assumption of uniform conditional PMF for (ω) ⊆ 2 given ω ∈ 1 . This assumption results in a marginal PMF for 2 that is equal to Bet P m , where m is the BPA on state space 2 induced by hint H . Dempster's combination rule never enters the picture in the derivation on H r (H ). Deng. Deng [10] proposes a definition of entropy of BPA m for X as follows:
The first component, Nguyen's definition of entropy, is a measure of conflict, and the second component is a measure of non-specificity. Deng's definition satisfies the probability consistency property. Abellán [2] shows that Deng's definition does not satisfy monotonicity, additivity, and subadditivity properties. It also does not satisfy the maximum entropy property. A summary of the properties of the various definitions of entropy of DS belief functions is shown in Table 1 .
A new definition of entropy for DS theory
In this section, we propose a new definition of entropy for DS theory. The new definition of entropy is based partially on the plausibility transform.
A new definition of entropy of a BPA. To explain the basic idea behind the following definition consider a simple example with an urn containing n balls of up to two colors: white (w), and black (b). Suppose we draw a ball at random from the urn and X denotes its color. What is the entropy of the BPA for X in the situation where we know that there is at least one ball of each color in the urn? The simplest case is when n = 2. In this case the entropy is exactly the same as in tossing a fair coin: log(2) = 1. Naturally, the greater n is, the greater uncertainty in the model. As there is no information preferring one color to another one, the only probabilistic description of the model is a uniform PMF. In DS theory, the BPA describing . Therefore, the entropy function for this BPA must be greater than or equal to Shannon's entropy of a uniform PMF with two states (log(2) = 1), and increasing with increasing n. This is why the following definition of entropy of a BPA m consists of two components. The first component is Shannon's entropy of a PMF that corresponds to m, and the second component includes entropy associated with non-singleton focal sets of m. Suppose m is a BPA for X . The entropy of m is defined as follows:
Like some of the definitions in the literature, the first component in Eq. (41) Let
for all x ∈ X , and therefore H s (P Pl ι X ) = log(n), which is the maximum of all PMFs defined on X . Also H d (ι X ) = log(n), which is the maximum of Dubois-Prade's entropy over all BPAs m for X . Thus, H(m) satisfies the maximum entropy property. 
and BPA m 2 for {X, Y } as follows: 
Additional properties of H (m)
In this section, we describe some additional properties of H(m) defined in Eq. (41).
Entropy as an expected value. One interpretation of Shannon's entropy in probability theory is that it equals the expected value of information received when learning state x ∈ X , i.e., (42) where
represents the information received when learning that state x ∈ X has occurred. Notice that the amount of this information is not the property of state x, but that of its probability.
In the case where our knowledge is encoded by a BPA m (instead of a PMF), we can decompose the information in m into two parts. The first part is the PMF Pl_P m , and the second part (not captured by the first part) is log(|a|), which happens with probability m(a). Consider the vacuous BPA function ι X for X , where X = {x, x}. We can decompose the uncertainty in ι X into the uncertainty in the PMF P Pl ι X (which is given by P Pl ι X (x) = 1/2, and P Pl ι X (x) = 1/2). But this doesn't capture the entire uncertainty in ι X . We also have to include the uncertainty log(| X |). The expected value of the first part is Shannon's entropy H(P Pl ι X ) = 1 bit, and the expected value of the second is ι X ( X ) log(| X |) = 1 bit. Thus, we can interpret H(m) as an expected value, but with respect to two different sources of uncertainty. The first part is expected value of information I(x) with respect to PMF Pl_P m , and the second part is expected value of information necessary to eliminate the uncertainty emerging from the size of X , i.e., log(|a|), with respect to "distribution" m, i.e., a∈2 X m(a) log(|a|). The second part corresponds to the measure of uncertainty suggested by Richard Hartley in 1928 [19] , about which Rényi showed that it is the only one satisfying additivity and monotonicity properties (for a precise formulation of this property see [40] ). Notice that both parts are measured in same units (bits), and it makes sense to add the two. H s (P X ⊗ P X ) ≤ H s (P X ) (43) Repetitio est mater studiorum. Learning the same knowledge twice should contribute to our cognizance more than learning it only once. In general, the Bayes combination rule is not idempotent, i.e., P X ⊗ P X = P X . Some PMFs are idempotent. For example, the equally likely PMF, and PMFs that rule out some states and have equally likely probabilities for the others, are idempotent. For non-idempotent PMFs, if we combine P X with itself, then the states with higher probabilities are now more likely, and states with lower probabilities are less likely. Consider the following property of Shannon entropy [52] :
Suppose X is a random variable with state space X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and suppose P 1 and P 2 are PMFs for X such that P 1 (x i ) = p i and P 2 (x i ) = q i . Suppose that q 1 ≥ q 2 ≥ . . . ≥ q n , and p 1 = q 1 − , p 2 = q 2 + , p i = q i for i = 3, . . . , n, where 0 ≤ ≤ q 1 . Then H s (P 2 ) ≥ H s (P 1 ).
Using this property repeatedly, it can be shown that the inequality in Eq. (43) holds. One may be tempted to believe that such a property also holds for all BPAs, i.e., H(m ⊕ m) ≤ H(m). But, as shown in Example 9, it is not true. , and (m ⊕ m)({x 2 , x 3 }) = 4 5 . To understand this more intuitively, notice that our definition of entropy H(m) has two components. The first one, H s (Pl_P m ) can be considered a measure of conflict (or confusion or dissonance or discord or strife), and the second one, H d (m) can be considered a measure of non-specificity. Thus, while the property in Eq. (43) holds for PMFs, it is not valid for BPAs in the DS theory because of the non-specificity component. When we combine m with itself, probability migrates from subsets with lower plausibility to subsets with larger plausibility [6] . If we have a BPA such that a larger subset has higher plausibility, then H d (m ⊕ m) > H d (m).
Summary and conclusion
Interpreting Shannon's entropy of a PMF of a discrete random variable as the amount of uncertainty in the PMF [47] , we propose six desirable properties of entropy of a basic probability assignment in the DS theory of belief functions. Four of the six properties are motivated by the analogous properties of Shannon's entropy of PMFs. The maximum entropy property is based on our intuition that a vacuous belief function has more uncertainty than a Bayesian belief function. Some of these six properties are different from the five properties proposed by Klir and Wierman [26] . Two of the properties they require, set consistency and range, are inconsistent with some of the properties we propose. Also, one of the properties that they require, subadditivity, is not included in our set as we are unable to formulate a definition of entropy that would simultaneously satisfy the six properties we suggest plus subadditivity. Also, besides the six properties, we also require that H(m) should always exist, and H(m) should be a continuous function of m. Thus, a set monotonicity property suggested by Abellán-Masegosa [3] based on credal set semantics of belief functions that are not compatible with Dempster's rule is not included in our set of requirements.
